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Agriculture touches everyone’s life.  Agriculture, however, is not an industry 
without risks.  Risks prevail for both farm families and consumers.  The federal 
government intervenes through agricultural policy to alleviate these risks.  Policymakers 
typically focus on providing agricultural assistance to minimize price, market or 
production risk for agricultural producers.  A variety of programs devised by Congress 
and operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) support farm income and 
help farmers and ranchers manage production or price risks.  The foundation of 
agricultural programs is government intervention intended to provide a farm safety net to 
agricultural producers.  These programs aid in managing the food supply while 
stabilizing agricultural infrastructure.     
The 2014 Farm Act represents a shift in the direction of agricultural policy toward 
risk management policies, which offer a variety of programs for producers.  Through 
multiple coverage options, these programs aim to raise producers’ revenues, on average, 
and reduce volatility.  Specifically, federal crop insurance has expanded over the past two 
decades and is considered the most extensive component of the safety net provided by the 
current farm bill given the availability of policies for a considerable portion of U.S. 
agriculture.  With federal crop insurance policies, producers pay a portion of the premium 
with the remainder subsidized by the federal government.  The relative importance of 
federal crop insurance for a specific commodity or geographic region may be debatable.  
This study investigates the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for U.S. peanut 




financial stability of these farms is considered to test for correlations between crop 
insurance utilization and potential crop insurance indemnity payments. 
Crop insurance selection for a peanut enterprise is multi-faceted.  Decisions must 
be made on policy type for a range of coverage levels and pricing options.  This study 
considered a portion of those options.  The level of effectiveness varied within each of 
the variables.  In general, the yield protection model generated a greater level of 
effectiveness than the revenue protection or catastrophic policies but was effective on less 
than one-third of the total observations.  A higher coverage level resulted in higher levels 
of effectiveness, but even at the maximum level tested, 75 percent coverage, less than 
three out of five of the observations were deemed effective.   
Differences in effectiveness were seen across regions and cultivars, with the 
maximum effectiveness for any of these only at one-third of the observations.  When 
considering the effectiveness by farm size, farms with peanut acreage in the 750 to 999 
range showed 60 percent positive observations.  Finally, when looking at individual 
farms, crop insurance was effective for all crop insurance options analyzed for five 
percent of the farms.  Ten percent of the farms had no positive observations regardless of 
coverage type or level.  These results challenge the effectiveness of crop insurance as a 
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Agriculture touches everyone’s life.  Whether as a direct or indirect participant in 
agricultural production or as a consumer of agricultural goods and services, every 
individual partakes of something agriculture related.  While the importance of agriculture 
is evident, it is not an industry without risks.  Risks prevail for both farm families and 
consumers.  The federal government intervenes through agricultural policy to alleviate 
these risks.  Policymakers typically focus on providing agricultural assistance to 
minimize price, market or production risk for agricultural producers.  Practically all 
industrialized nations subsidize agriculture to some extent. 
Agricultural production is a capital-intensive industry that faces various inherent 
risks with often high levels of volatility in market prices and a variety of production risk 
factors.  One highly debated topic related to agriculture is agricultural programs or 
subsidies.  “Subsidies” can refer to a range of policy options often targeted at mitigating 
these risks.  A variety of programs, devised by Congress and operated by the USDA, 
support farm income and help farmers and ranchers manage production or price risks.  
Although the tools and implementation processes may vary, the foundation of agricultural 
programs is government intervention intended to provide a farm safety net to agricultural 




U.S. Agricultural Production and Agricultural Policy: Current Situation 
While farmers and their families comprised almost one-fourth of the U.S. 
population almost a century ago, today they represent only one percent of the population.  
This decline in the number of farms, coupled with a relatively flat trend in acres of 
farmland, has led to an expansion in the size of an average farm operation.  The most 
recent 2012 Census of Agriculture data show the number of farms has stabilized around 
2.1 million with an average size of 434 acres.  More than half of farm entities are 
considered small, having less than $10,000 in gross annual sales of farm products, and 
contribute a relatively small portion to the domestic food supply while more than half of 
principal operators had a primary occupation other than farming.  Many of the remaining 
agricultural producers have expanded in size to gain efficiencies in operations from 
economies of scale while also diversifying their operations to help minimize risks 
associated with agricultural markets and production conditions.  Critics of agricultural 
programs often label large farm operations as corporate or industrial agricultural 
production and cite cronyism as a challenge within the political arena.  Additionally, due 
to a variety of factors, including cultural practices, commodity choice, regional and 
climatic impacts, to name a few, there is great variability in the size and diversity of 
farms across the U.S.   
These factors can impact the participation of producers in federal farm programs 
and the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of those programs to a farm operation.  They 
also play a role when analyzing the effectiveness of a taxpayer-funded safety net in the 
form of agricultural programs.  The 2014 Farm Act represents a shift in the direction of 




in their overall risk management strategy as potential supplements to market-based 
instruments for addressing farm risk.  Meanwhile, the demand for food continues to grow 
in relation to the expanding world population.  Agricultural policy aids in managing the 
food supply while stabilizing agricultural infrastructure.  The current farm bill has not 
only provided for domestically produced goods but also promotes agricultural trade.  
These benefits are passed along to the consumer through food availability.   
Purpose of Policy Analysis:  Planning for 2018 Farm Bill 
With an estimated world population of 9 billion people by 2050, agriculture 
remains a relevant topic worldwide, although, fluctuating economic and political 
environments have fostered significant changes in the focus of farm bill legislation, 
agricultural programs, and safety net provisions.  Federal crop insurance has expanded 
over the past two decades and is considered to be the most extensive component of the 
safety net provided by the current farm bill given the availability of policies for a 
considerable portion of U.S. agriculture.  Currently, federal crop insurance’s scope is 
broad with policies available for more than 130 commodities including grains, fruits and 
vegetables, pasture, nursery crops, and livestock.  Producers pay a portion of the 
premium with the remainder subsidized by the federal government.   
The structural changes to the farm safety net brought about by the 2014 farm bill 
highlighted the potential for cash flow problems on operations as the timing of program 
payments shifted.  Under the prior farm bill, at least a portion of payments could be 
received in advance.  However, under current legislation payments are delayed until after 
the crop year.  As a result, many operations required additional operating loans or were 




of crop insurance to secure necessary operating loans.  Furthermore, as drafting of the 
2018 farm bill continues, agricultural producers are facing low commodity prices and 
thin markets, which may further hinder the economic viability of agricultural production.  
This market instability can then increase the reliance on the safety net provided by 
agricultural programs.  The increased reliance on federal crop insurance warrants an 
investigation into the potential financial returns relative to the cost of crop insurance for 
agricultural producers. 
Problem Statement 
Current political debate brings forth both proponents and critics of not only the 
necessity but also the effectiveness of using federal taxpayer dollars to provide a safety 
net for agricultural producers.  Critics point to the current availability of risk management 
tools in a market economy and the inequity of providing a safety net to agriculture 
production while other industries do not receive the same benefits (Bakst, 2016).  
Proponents point to not only the potential instability of agricultural revenue but also the 
necessity of a secure food and fiber source for our nation and a growing world 
population.  The underlying question of whether enacted farm policies provide an 
effective safety net to stabilize producer income while ensuring a safe and affordable 
food source for consumers remains.  Moreover, the efficacy of government spending for 
agricultural programs will continue to receive heightened attention under the current 
political scrutiny of government spending.  Specifically, this study will use case study 
analysis to explore the relationship between crop insurance for peanuts and the financial 





This analysis will utilize an unbiased approach to investigate the effectiveness of 
crop insurance as a component of the safety net for agricultural producers.  Specifically, 
utilizing a case study approach, representative U.S. peanut farms will be analyzed to 
determine if crop insurance correlates to the financial stability of domestic agricultural 
peanut producers.  Secondary data from the USDA, coupled with the National Center for 
Peanut Competitiveness (NCPC) representative peanut farm data, will be utilized to 
analyze the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net.  Crop insurance premiums, 
indemnity payments, and net returns will be compared across various farm characteristics 
to determine the impact on each.  Evaluative criteria will include indicators of financial 
stability and economic viability for each of the representative peanut farms.  
Additionally, national data for similar criteria will be analyzed to assess the effectiveness 
over time for various regions and commodities. 
Significance of the Study: Effectiveness as a Policy Analysis Criterion  
Price and production volatility coupled with the “thin” nature of agricultural 
markets are examples of market failure characteristics in the agricultural industry.  The 
current level of concentration within the agricultural economy is further exacerbating the 
market volatility issue.  As markets for both inputs and outputs become thinner, both 
agricultural producers and consumers face imperfect markets.  Federal subsidies paid 
directly to agricultural producers are one example of government intervention to correct 
market failures.  Current government interventions, authorized in the 2014 farm 
legislation, to correct market failure in the agricultural industry shifted focus to crop 




management tool available to provide one component of a safety net for agricultural 
producers.  This study seeks to objectively analyze the impact of federal crop insurance 
on U.S. peanut farms.  This study may further provide valuable insight into not only the 
economic health and well-being of one sector of the agricultural industry but also current 
and future political analysis and debate in drafting agricultural policy.  Additionally, 
future research could encompass additional agricultural commodities, regions, or risk 
management tools. 
Summary 
While the need for agriculture remains constant, federal intervention to stabilize 
the industry over the last eight decades has not as evidenced by changes in agricultural 
policy and the form and nature of agricultural programs.  The agricultural safety net will 
likely continue to evolve with the drafting of each new farm bill.  Proactive policy 
analysis must remain a primary focus for all stakeholders involved.  The following 
analysis will take a proactive approach to consider the impact of federal crop insurance 
on providing an effective safety net U.S. peanut farms. 
The organization of the remaining chapters is as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the literature and discusses in detail the importance of agriculture, the history 
and evolution of agricultural policy, and the rationale for current policy initiatives.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methods used to investigate the effectiveness of crop insurance as 
a safety net for U.S. peanut producers.  It details study participants, data sources, study 
measures, and statistical analyses.  Chapter 4 discusses the study results and an analysis 
of the findings.  In conclusion, Chapter 5 provides limitations of the study, study 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Problem Statement and Overview  
 The Agricultural Act of 2014 provides authorization for services and programs 
that impact every American as well as billions around the globe.  The legislation expands 
upon economic gains in rural America while providing program reform and billions in 
savings for the taxpayer.  Among the changes from previous legislation are reforms in the 
farm safety net provided for agricultural producers.  First, the Direct and Counter-
Cyclical Program (DCP) and the Average Crop Revenue Election program were repealed.  
Direct payments, a system that paid producers regardless of whether they incurred losses, 
were eliminated.  Under the 2014 legislation, two new programs, Price Loss Coverage 
(PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) were established, cotton was not eligible 
for inclusion in these new programs, and producers had to choose one of the options.  The 
repeal of these programs shifted focus to federal crop insurance to serve a primary 
function as the safety net for agricultural producers.  Specifically, Titles XI and XII of the 
2014 Farm Act covered crop insurance.  New and continuing insurance products were 
authorized to protect agricultural producers against losses resulting from price and yield 
risks. 
 The enacted changes coupled with thin markets in the current agricultural 
economy provide a dynamic environment that may augment producers’ reliance on a 




whether the current farm policies provide an effective safety net to stabilize producer 
income while ensuring a safe and affordable food source for consumers remains.  The 
normative economic prescription for farm policy coupled with the positive political-
economic analysis related to agricultural policy warrants discussion (Innes, 2003). 
 To analyze the effectiveness of agricultural policy as a component of the farm 
safety net, one must first understand the importance of agriculture, the history and 
evolution of agricultural policy, the current situation of the agricultural industry, and a 
review of federal crop insurance past to present.  Furthermore, a brief examination of 
macroeconomic farm financial factors is warranted.  This chapter seeks to provide such 
an overview beginning with a discussion of the relevance of agriculture to not only 
individuals but also the U.S. economy. 
Importance of Agriculture 
In 2015 agriculture and related industries contributed 5.5 percent to the U.S. gross 
domestic product (GDP), while accounting for 11.1 percent of U.S. employment (Kassel 
et al., 2017).  Meanwhile, food purchases ranked third, only to housing and 
transportation, in U.S. household consumer expenditures in 2015 (Kuhns, 2017).  While 
the importance of agriculture is evident, it is not an industry without risks.  Risks prevail 
for both farm families and consumers.  The federal government intervenes through 
agricultural policy to alleviate these risks.   
As a capital-intensive industry, agricultural production faces various inherent 
risks with often high levels of volatility in market prices and a variety of production risk 
factors.  Agricultural subsidies, which can refer to a range of policy options targeted at 




citizens, and various interest groups but also geographic regions and commodity groups.  
A variety of programs devised by Congress and operated by the USDA support farm 
income and help farmers and ranchers manage production or price risks.  Although the 
tools and implementation processes may vary, the foundation of agricultural programs is 
government intervention intended to provide a farm safety net to agricultural producers.  
The three main components of the farm safety net under the 2014 farm bill include 
permanently authorized federal crop insurance, farm commodity price and income 
support programs for crop years 2014-2018, and permanently authorized agricultural 
disaster programs with emergency loans and USDA discretionary programs providing 
additional support (Shields, 2015).  Proponents of agricultural subsidized programs point 
to the various risks faced by agricultural producers, including human and personal risk, 
institutional risk, financial risk, price or market risk, and production risk, to justify 
government intervention in agricultural markets.  Furthermore, these risks impact not 
only producers but also consumers who rely on the availability of a safe, affordable, and 
reliable food source as crop disasters or imperfect market conditions can disrupt food 
availability and retail prices.  
Policymakers typically focus on providing agricultural assistance to minimize 
price or market risk and production risk for agricultural producers.  Practically all 
industrialized nations subsidize agriculture to some extent.  In 2012 agricultural subsidies 
were estimated at $486 billion in the top 21 food producing countries worldwide with 
Asian countries spending more than all other countries combined (Potter, 2014).  
Specifically, in the U.S. agricultural, or farm, subsidies are payments or other support 




As shown in Figure 1, federal government direct farm program payments have ranged 
from a high of more than $24 billion to a low of $9.7 billion when considering the years 
2000 to present (USDA ERS Farm Income and Wealth).  The most current U.S. farm bill 
legislation, passed in 2014, was projected to have an average annual cost of $18 billion 
for mandatory spending including commodity titles, crop insurance, and conservation 
over the life of the bill based on Congressional Budget Office projections at the time 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2014).  The actual cost of the farm safety net provided to 
agricultural producers may, in fact, be higher in certain years and lower in others given 
the volatility in commodity prices since the legislation passed. 
 
Figure 1. Direct Farm Program Payments  
Source: USDA ERS Farm Income and Wealth Statistics 
Historical Beginnings of U.S. Farm Programs 
Federal support for agriculture in the U.S. can be traced back to the late 1800s 
with the passage of the Morrill and Hatch Acts which, respectively, established land-
grant colleges and funded agricultural research.  In 1914 the Smith-Lever Act furthered 
federal support of agriculture by funding agricultural education.  The Federal Farm Loan 





foundation for the current Farm Credit System which recently celebrated its 100th 
birthday.  Though federal support for agriculture was strong, it was not until 1929 that 
direct subsidy support to producers commenced when the Agricultural Marketing Act 
created the Federal Farm Board.  These early efforts at direct producer subsidies, 
however, were not met with success.  As the board raised commodity prices, inventories 
stockpiled, and in 1933 the program was abolished after a cost of $500 million (Edwards, 
2016).  
Many farm programs were enacted during the Great Depression to provide 
economic stability to farmers while ensuring a domestic food supply for Americans at a 
time in which farmers, along with their families, comprised about one-fourth of the 
nation’s population (White, 2016).  The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and other 
New Deal programs included various policy tools to mitigate the risk to agriculture 
including commodity price supports, production controls, and trade protectionism 
measures such as marketing orders and import barriers, and crop insurance (Edwards, 
2016).  Over the next several decades, various modifications to farm policy were enacted.  
As the political pendulum has swung, so too have efforts to reduce and expand the 
agricultural producer safety net.  Shifts have seen a push toward pro-market efforts with 
the elimination of quotas back to expansions of direct subsidies to stabilize market risks. 
More than eight decades after the Agricultural Adjustment Act, agricultural 
subsidies, although in a different format, still exist with an average cost to the U.S. 
government under the current legislation projected to be around $20 billion per year, 
according to the Congressional Budget Office (Charles, 2016).  Opponents frequently 




while discouraging innovation (Edwards, 2016).  Meanwhile, proponents point to 
government programs as an aid to keep farms profitable and agriculture infrastructure 
stable during times of market volatility and production uncertainty to help ensure a safe 
and affordable food supply (Leadership Report, 2015).    
Characteristics of U.S. Agricultural Production: Current Situation 
While farmers and their families comprised almost one-fourth of the U.S. 
population almost a century ago, today they represent only one percent of the population.  
As shown in Table 1, the number of farms has declined from a peak of 6.8 million in 
1935 to around 2 million in recent decades as agricultural productivity has increased and 
non-farm job opportunities have expanded.  This decline in the number of farms, coupled 
with a relatively flat trend in acres of farmland, has led to an expansion in the size of an 
average farm operation.  
Table 1. Number of U.S. Farms, 1982-2012 (Millions) and Average Farm Size (acres).  
Year Number of Farms 
(Millions) 
Average Farm Size 
(Acres) 
1982 2.48 440 
1987 2.34 462 
1992 2.18 491 
1997 2.22 431 
2002 2.13 441 
2007 2.02 418 
2012 2.11 434 
Source: USDA NASS, 2012 Census of Agriculture  
The 2012 Census of Agriculture data show the number of farms has stabilized 
around 2.1 million with an average size of 434 acres.  Many of the remaining agricultural 




scale while also often diversifying their operations to help minimize risks associated with 
agricultural markets and production conditions.  Critics of agricultural programs often 
label large farm operations as corporate or industrial agricultural production and cite 
cronyism as a challenge within the political arena.  It is appropriate to note that while the 
average size of farm operations has grown and instances of abuse (as with any program) 
may exist, farm operations are still primarily family-owned operations.  Additionally, due 
to a variety of factors including cultural practices, commodity choice, regional and 
climatic impacts, there is great variability in the size and diversity of farms across the 
U.S.  These factors can impact the participation of producers in federal farm programs 
and the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the programs.   
Other interesting characteristics of the current U.S. agricultural structure relate to 
the number of small farms and primary income source of principal operators.  Over 56 
percent of farms are considered small, with annual sales of less than $10,000, and 
contribute a relatively small portion to the domestic food supply while more than 52 
percent of principal operators had a primary occupation other than farming (USDA 
NASS).  Each of these characteristics can play a role when analyzing the effectiveness of 
a taxpayer-funded safety net in the form of agricultural programs.  Meanwhile, the 
demand for food continues to grow with the expanding world population.  Agricultural 
programs aid in managing the food supply while stabilizing agricultural infrastructure.  
The current farm bill has not only provided for domestically produced goods but also 
promotes agricultural trade.  These benefits are passed along to the consumer through 




A USDA report further expounds that the current legislation provides an 
opportunity for producers to layer programs to mitigate the impacts from downside risks 
related to market and weather volatility:  
Agricultural producers face significant uncertainties in production and prices that 
lead to unpredictable swings in farm returns.  The 2014 Farm Act represents a 
shift in the direction of risk management policies, offering a variety of programs 
for producers.  Through multiple coverage options, these programs raise 
producers’ revenues on average and reduce volatility.  As such, the programs can 
be used by producers in their overall risk management strategy as potential 
supplements to market-based instruments for addressing farm risk. (Hungerford et 
al., 2017)   
Current government interventions, authorized in the 2014 farm legislation, to correct 
market failure in the agricultural industry shifted focus to crop insurance.  Crop insurance 
is touted as a risk management tool available to provide one component of a safety net for 
agricultural producers.  Crop insurance is available for more than 130 crops and is 
frequently purchased by U.S. peanut producers as one component of their risk 
management strategies. 
Evolution of Peanut Policy 
As the focus narrows from agriculture in general to specifically U.S. peanut 
farms, a review of recent policy changes as related to the peanut industry and the 
establishment of representative peanut farms is warranted.  Agricultural policy has 
changed significantly over the past eight decades, especially for the peanut industry.  The 




allotments were “bought-out” and the industry moved more toward a market system.  
Former quota holders were suddenly faced with a lower price per ton and increased 
competition while non-quota holders had the opportunity to produce peanuts at a price 
higher than the historic additional market price.  International markets garnered new 
awareness by U.S. peanut producers.  Given the transition in the industry, the University 
of Georgia National Center for Peanut Competitiveness (NCPC) worked closely with 
Texas A & M Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) to establish representative 
peanut farms across the U.S. to aid in future peanut policy analysis.   
The AFPC has established and maintained representative farms for various 
agricultural commodities, except peanuts, since the 1980s.  These representative farms 
continue to be the primary vehicle used by the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture and 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry to analyze agricultural 
policy.  The NCPC established and maintains the only representative peanut farm 
database, which includes 20 farms representing each of the major U.S. peanut production 
areas.  The representative peanut farm database has been used for every farm bill since 
2002 to analyze the impact of policy options and to provide input to U.S. ag. committees 
during policy development.  This database continues to be maintained by the NCPC.  
Data collected in recent updates of these farms captured not only current characteristics 
of each farm but also factors affecting management decisions, production practices, 
yields, revenues, and expenses.  Data specifically relevant to this study include 
information related to crop insurance coverage type, levels and premiums, production 




Federal Crop Insurance from Past to Present 
To thoroughly analyze the effectiveness of federal crop insurance as a safety net 
for domestic peanut producers, an examination of not only current agricultural policy but 
also a review of the evolution of that policy is warranted.  Federal crop insurance was 
first authorized by Congress in the 1930s, along with other federal initiatives, to help 
agriculture recover from the effects of both the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl.  The 
legislation authorizing “the federal crop insurance program states that the purpose of the 
program is to promote the national welfare by improving the economic stability of 
agriculture” (Morris 2015, 6).  To administer the program, the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) was established in 1938 to oversee the program which began as an 
experiment and remained as such for almost five decades.  Originally, crop insurance was 
limited with a primary focus on major crops in the main producing areas.  The landscape 
changed with the passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 as the program 
expanded to include many more crops and regions and also “authorized a subsidy equal 
to 30 percent of the crop insurance premium limited to the dollar amount at 65-percent 
coverage” to encourage producer participation (USDA RMA History of the Crop 
Insurance Program). 
This shift in agricultural policy was, at least partially, driven by the desire to shift 
government intervention in agricultural production to an ex ante rather than ex post 
approach.  In the two decades preceding the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, the 
experimental crop insurance program competed with free disaster coverage and producers 
received compensation for losses resulting from both prevented planting and yield.  




program, it did not reach the participation levels that Congress had anticipated.  Adverse 
weather conditions led to a series of ad hoc disaster bills between 1988 and 1994 with 
Congress funding agricultural emergency relief measures to help stabilize the farm 
economy (Dismukes and Coble, 2006).  These ad hoc disaster bills were further viewed 
as lessening the importance of and producers’ reliance on the federal crop insurance 
program.  In efforts to curtail the ad hoc ex ante aid, lawmakers sought to promote 
increased producer participation in federal crop insurance programs which led to the 
enactment of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk 
Protection Act of 2000 (Innes, 2003). 
To increase participation and shift a larger portion of the risk management burden 
to agricultural producers, the 1994 Act mandated producer participation in the crop 
insurance program to be eligible for other federal agricultural safety net provisions.  With 
this change came the creation of catastrophic (CAT) coverage, which compensated 
producers for losses exceeding 50 percent of an average yield paid at 60 percent of the 
price established for the crop for the year.  The premiums for CAT coverage were 
subsidized, and producers only paid a fee of $50 per crop per county to insure their crops.  
In 1996 the mandatory participation requirement was repealed, and the Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) was established to administer FCIC programs as well as other risk 
management and education programs to help support U.S. agriculture.  The efforts of 
lawmakers to entice agricultural producers to participate in the expanded crop insurance 
program were not without merit.  With each successive act, crop insurance participation 
increased.  After the passage of the 1994 Act, participation increased significantly with 




acres of field crops, insured under the program in 1998 (USDA RMA History of the Crop 
Insurance Program). 
The turn of the century brought additional changes to the federal crop insurance 
program that remain in effect today.  These changes greatly expanded the role of private 
sector entities while also increasing premium subsidies.  The private entities can 
participate in conducting research and developing new insurance products while also 
employing expanded contracting and partnering authority.  The change brought forth a 
public-private partnership to administer the federal crop insurance program with the 
public FCIC’s mission being to encourage the sale of crop insurance, through the licensed 
private agents and brokers, while also providing reinsurance or subsidies to approved 
commercial insurers of agricultural commodities through FCIC approved plans.  For 
almost two decades, the private sector’s role has been to sell and service all Multiple Peril 
Crop Insurance (MPCI) authorized under the Federal Crop Insurance Act (USDA RMA 
History of the Crop Insurance Program).  
While the tools and program may have changed, the overall mission remains 
intact as evidenced by RMA’s mission statement which poises the agency to “provide 
risk-management tools, such as crop insurance, to strengthen the economic stability of 
agricultural producers and rural communities” (Morris 2015, 6).  Further, the RMA’s 
strategic plan set forth a goal for 2011 to 2015 for the federal crop insurance program to 
provide a broad-based financial safety net for producers by continuing to expand 
participation, ensuring actuarially sound products, and safeguarding the integrity of the 
program, while being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars with transparency.  The 




management options for farmers and ranchers by making crop insurance more affordable 
for beginning farmers.  It also provided avenues to expand farm safety net options for 
organic producers and specialty crop producers. 
Participation in Federal Crop Insurance Programs 
   Producer participation in federal crop insurance has varied over time with 
individual participation dependent upon a host of factors.  Policy debate in the late 1980s 
pointed to concern about the effectiveness of the Multiple Peril Crop Insurance Program 
as the primary means of federal agricultural disaster assistance (Vandeveer and Loehman, 
1994).  As a result, changes were implemented to enhance producer participation while 
also improving performance.  Regardless, concerns over adverse selection, moral hazard, 
low coverage, and inadequate premium setting methods have received considerable 
attention in agricultural economics literature.  A challenge in the agricultural policy 
debate of finding a balance between the desire of government officials to reduce costs, 
the desire of farm state members of Congress to deliver for their constituents, and the 
desire of producers to maximize protection for the risks inherent to agricultural 
production transcends the timeline of federal aid to agriculture.    
Under current legislation and farm programs, agricultural producers can purchase 
a policy for an insurable crop at a selected coverage level.  As the coverage level 
increases, so too does the premium.  Premium subsidies alter the price of crop insurance 
and, likely, the demand for the product as a risk management tool.  An Economic 
Research Service (ERS) study explored federal crop insurance usage and how demand 
shifts with changes in the price of crop insurance.  Results suggest that as premium 




same number of acres enrolled (O’Donoghue, 2014).  One concern as subsidy levels 
increase to encourage participation is the anticipated increase in the cost to the federal 
government.  A small increase in the subsidy rate can lead to relatively large increases in 
the cost to the government.  Dependent upon political will, changing the level of 
subsidies could be one means of changing the demand for federal crop insurance or 
altering budget expenditures (O’Donoghue, 2014).   
Mitchell et al. (2012) identified factors that significantly influence farmers’ 
intentions to participate in crop insurance after changes brought about by the 2008 Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act.  Specifically, study results suggest that primary crops, risk 
perceptions, risk aversion, and program complexity were important factors affecting 
producer participation (Mitchell et al., 2012).  To expand upon prior study, which 
examined the factors associated with the purchase of crop insurance, Sherrick et al. 
(2004) analyzed Midwestern farmers’ choices among crop insurance alternatives and 
determined how levels of risk, risk management practices, production, and financial 
factors influenced these choices.  The study findings indicated variation among crop 
insurance participants related to business, personal, and other characteristics across the 
types of insurance products available.  Midwestern producers who were highly leveraged, 
less wealthy, riskier and operated larger acreages were more likely to extensively use 
insurance specifically with revenue coverage (Sherrick et al., 2004).  As crop insurance 
continues to serve an increasingly important role in agricultural policy, further review of 
management practices and risk management tool selection by specific regions and 




Currently, the federal government subsidizes, on average, 62 percent of the total 
premium on non-catastrophic policies and 100 percent on catastrophic policies (Shields, 
2015).  Summary data for the 2014 crop year indicated 294 million acres and 83 percent 
of the U.S. crop acreage were insured under the federal crop insurance program with four 
crops, corn, cotton, soybeans, and wheat, typically accounting for more than 70 percent 
of the total enrolled acres (Shields, 2015).  A detailed review of peanut policies can 
further provide insight in policy planning and the effectiveness of federal crop insurance 
in providing a safety net for peanut producers while assuring a safe and reliable food 
source for consumers.   
Overview of Farm Economic and Financial Factors 
As federal agricultural policy and programs have changed, the day-to-day 
operation of many farms has been impacted.  The ebb and flow of both agricultural 
production and markets call for times of increased need for a farm safety net for specific 
regions or commodities followed by the reduced need in others.  Agriculture, as a whole, 
is considered to have had better times in recent years and, as a result, is considered at 
lower risk of bankruptcy as contrasted to the historic levels in the 1980s.  However, the 
trend in the leveraging of operations with land, coupled with increased land values, does 
raise the concern about a possible land price bubble (Marzen, 2016).  Thus, obtaining an 
accurate assessment of the financial well-being of the farm sector proves a challenge 
given the diversity of the 2.1 million farms that comprise the sector.  As previously 
discussed, the agricultural industry is subject to wide fluctuations in both yields and 
prices.  An analysis of trends in farm income will point to its highly variable nature.  The 




owners related to a variety of topics ranging from resource allocation, risk management 
options, investment opportunities, and even household welfare (Key et al., 2017).  The 
far-reaching impact of the instability of income has long been championed as justification 
for agricultural policy and, specifically, the farm safety net.  Information at the national 
level is frequently reported while similar data evaluating the income variability of 
individual farm households have been scarce.   
One measure of farm sector financial well-being is farm sector net cash income.  
The total of all farm and farm-related revenue minus any cash expenses paid during the 
year represents farm sector net cash income.  This measure of financial well-being 
remained relatively stable through the early 2000s but grew in volatility beginning in 
2009.  Since 2009, growth led to record highs in 2012 and 2013 followed by sharp 
declines brought about by factors including declining global demand, the strengthening 
dollar, large inventories, and depressed commodity prices through 2016.  In both absolute 
and percentage terms, the decline in net cash income from 2013 to the forecast for 2016 
is the largest decline since the 1980s with farm prices for major commodities down 30 
percent or more (Prager et al., 2017).  This decline in commodity price and net farm 
income impacts revenue-based risk management tools.   
Consideration of farm sector assets, debt, and wealth indicates an increase of 4.4 
percent in farm sector debt while the market value of farm sector assets is expected to 
increase 4 percent.  Non-real estate assets are expected to continue a downward trend as 
lower crop prices coupled with increased costs and restrictive loan terms make obtaining 
operating and non-real estate loans more challenging (USDA ERS Farm Income and 




level of farm real estate debt forecast for 2017.  While federal crop insurance carries the 
potential to influence the behavior of participants, a 2015 study found that although 
participation in the federal crop insurance program is associated with an increase in the 
use of short-term farm debt, it is not associated with an increase in long-term debt (Ifft, 
Kuethe, Morehart, 2015).  However, agricultural producers are faced with placing real 
estate as collateral to secure the needed operating liquidity.  Utilization of real estate as 
operating collateral erodes farm equity.  An analysis is warranted to determine whether 
an erosion of equity is observed on U.S. peanut farms. 
One concern with the aggregation of data to report a national value is that the 
single value often masks the volatility experienced by individual farms.  A 2017 USDA 
ERS study conducted by Key et al. considered farm household income volatility based on 
panel data from a national survey.  The study focused on larger scale operations similar to 
those responsible for about 80 percent of U.S. agricultural output.  The findings point to 
higher levels of income volatility for these farm households relative to typical nonfarm 
households with the median change in total income between years about eight times 
larger than for nonfarm households (Key et al., 2017).  The study further considers the 
impact of crop insurance on the panel of individual farms, which include a variety of 
crops.   
The findings indicate that net crop insurance payments (indemnity payments 
minus premiums) are not large at an average of $6,628 per farm while the certainty 
equivalent (the amount each dollar received from crop insurance is worth on average to 
the farmer) per dollar of crop insurance payment is 1.38 (Key et al., 2017).  Key et al. 




authors go a step further and consider the average value received relative to median 
income fluctuations.  The average total payments for a farmer are around $24,000 while 
the median change in farm income between periods is $86,000 with a mean change of 
$261,000.  The significance of this relationship is to point out that the extent to which 
government programs can effectively smooth income is limited.  An analysis considering 
the income variability of commodities, specifically peanuts, is warranted.  The premise 
utilized in the Key et al. study will be employed for representative peanut farms to 
investigate the income variability and effectiveness of crop insurance measures. 
Concerns Surrounding Federal Crop Insurance Use 
As evidenced by the preceding discussion of recent trends and literature 
considering federal crop insurance, producer participation has increased as federal crop 
insurance has become a pillar of the current agricultural safety net.  This transition has 
not been without costs.  The federal government subsidizes premiums and covers all costs 
related to selling and servicing the policy to encourage participation.  The increased 
demand for federal crop insurance policies, which provide greater coverage, has resulted 
in increased government spending and has drawn attention to the future of the federal 
crop insurance program as critics call for reform.  While literature considering various 
commodities and geographic regions is available, analysis specifically focused on the 
impact on peanut producers is lacking and thus justifies this study.  
Federal Crop Insurance: An Agricultural Example of Public Administration   
Considering the possible theoretical framework of federal crop insurance as not 
only a risk management tool for agricultural producers but also the surrounding prefaces 




government to rectify the market failure is in the interest of not only the producer but also 
the public.  Options for situating policy questions include market, production, 
conformity, and evolutionary models.  While agricultural policy questions lend credence 
to a variety of these models, the question of the effectiveness of farm programs as a 
means to stabilize producer income and ensure availability of an affordable food source 
for consumers can best be framed from a market failure approach.  Market failure theory 
is a popular paradigm for identifying specific problems that relate to the disequilibrium 
between supply and demand in a market which warrants government intervention through 
policy options to establish equilibration through exchange.  The price and production 
volatility coupled with the “thin” nature of agricultural markets are examples of market 
failure characteristics in the agricultural industry.  
Political will deems the necessity of stabilizing the agricultural sector to assure 
the availability of a safe and affordable food supply.  Given the inherent risks and capital-
intense nature of agricultural production, the use of public policy tools is warranted to 
provide risk management options.  Risk balancing theory predicts that an increase in 
financial risk or debt use will result in response to the income and risk reduction aspects 
of federal crop insurance.  However, the effectiveness of federal crop insurance as a tool 
to reduce the risk in the aggregate farm sector is not conclusive.  While Lee and Djogo 
(1984) found that crop insurance could potentially improve the financial health of 
agricultural lenders and farm operations by reducing loan losses to agricultural lenders 
and Pfleuger and Barry (1986) surmised that crop insurance participation could improve 
liquidity and survival for a highly leveraged farm, Skees and Nutt (1988) found that 




lower levels of loss ratios.  The success of federal crop insurance at lowering total risk in 
the farm sector is significantly less than the decline in risk provided by federal crop 
insurance to individual operations (Ifft et al., 2015).  The impact of the federal crop 
insurance program on farm financial decisions is relevant as policymakers continue to 
debate future U.S. farm policy.    
Another consideration is the administration of the federal crop insurance program.  
The federal crop insurance program is currently a public-private partnership.  Public 
entities are involved in the administration and oversight of the program while private 
entities are responsible for delivery of the product to producers.  As transitions in the role 
of individuals and technology continue, it is important to consider not only the need but 
also the budgetary constraints of providing an efficient and effective deliverable that is 
deemed to have high value.  Specifically, as related to this project, peanut producers 
demand an effective safety net that provides an efficient risk management tool.  
Meanwhile, taxpayers demand the prudent use of limited budgetary dollars.  With any 
policy debate, there are multiple vantage points that must be considered.   
Summary 
Effective analysis of federal crop insurance as a safety net for domestic peanut 
producers requires not only an assessment of the current situation but also a retrospective 
and prospective lens.  Recent literature on federal crop insurance points to increased 
producer participation, in general, as the role of federal crop insurance expands in the 
provision of an agricultural safety net for U.S. producers and consumers.  However, it is 
important to note that this transition has not been without costs.  Specifically, the federal 




servicing the policy to encourage producer participation.  The increased demand for 
federal crop insurance policies has, thus, resulted in increased government spending.  
Increased government spending, in turn, may draw attention to the future of the federal 
crop insurance program as critics call for reform.  Commodity specific analysis is 
important to determine the impact to peanut producers from both a cost and benefit 











In this chapter, the types of data to be collected, their sources, research 
procedures, and statistical analyses utilized to measure the results are discussed.  
Utilizing secondary data, the study examines farm sector economic and financial data 
from USDA ERS, crop insurance statistics from USDA RMA, and enterprise farm data 
from The University of Georgia National Center for Peanut Competitiveness (NCPC) 
representative peanut farm database.  The NCPC database details the structure, 
management decisions, production yields, costs, and returns for peanut farms 
representing twenty different locations throughout the U.S. in the primary peanut 
producing regions.  Furthermore, the database has been utilized for almost two decades to 
analyze policy options related to peanut production.   
The study is framed from the underlying question of whether the current enacted 
farm policies provide an effective safety net to stabilize producer income while ensuring 
a safe and affordable food source for consumers.  Given the current and anticipated future 
political scrutiny of government spending, the efficacy of government spending for 
agricultural programs will continue to receive heightened attention.  Precisely, this study 
will use a case study analysis to explore the relationship between crop insurance for 
peanuts and the financial stability of peanut farms in the U.S.  To explore this 




 Research Objectives 
1. Objective one—To determine the relationship, if any, of crop insurance for 
peanuts and the financial stability, as evidenced by crop insurance selection 
and the net return above variable input cost for the peanut enterprise, for 
representative U.S. peanut farms. 
2. Objective two—To compare crop insurance utilization and financial stability 
measures among the representative peanut farms by geographic regions, 
cultural practices, and farm size. 
These objectives will address by the following research questions utilizing representative 
farm data collected.   
Research Questions 
 The specific research questions are as follows: 
1. Does federal crop insurance utilization positively impact the net farm income of 
U.S. peanut farms?  
2. Does the impact of crop insurance on the financial stability of U.S. peanut farms 
differ by geographic region, cultural practice, or farm size?  
Hypotheses 
Under the precept of the following hypotheses, the effectiveness of federal crop 
insurance in providing a safety net to U.S. peanut producers will be investigated: 
Hypothesis1: A positive relationship exists between crop insurance utilization 




 Null Hypothesis1: There is no relationship between crop insurance 
utilization (CIU) and financial stability (FS) on a representative U.S. 
peanut farm. 
Hypothesis2: A relationship exists between the effectiveness of crop insurance on 
the financial stability of a representative U.S. peanut farm and the geographic 
region, cultural practice, and farm size. 
 Null Hypothesis2: There is no relationship between the effectiveness of 
crop insurance on the financial stability of a representative U.S. peanut 
farm and the geographic region, cultural practice, and farm size. 
Should these hypotheses fail to be rejected, recommendations for changes to crop 
insurance policies can be made regarding its effectiveness as a safety net for U.S. peanut 
producers.  
Study Approach 
This analysis will utilize an unbiased approach to investigate the effectiveness of 
crop insurance as a primary component of the safety net for agricultural producers.  
Specifically, utilizing a case study approach, representative U.S. peanut farms will be 
analyzed to determine the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for peanut 
producers.  Secondary data from the USDA, coupled with the NCPC representative 
peanut farm data, will be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of crop insurance as a 
safety net.  Using a quantitative approach, crop insurance premiums, indemnity 
payments, and net returns above variable operating costs (RAVIC) will be determined for 
each representative peanut farm.  The results will then be evaluated.  Evaluative criteria 




representative peanut farms.  Specifically, crop insurance will be deemed effective as a 
safety net if the resulting RAVIC is positive.  Additionally, national data for similar 
criteria will be analyzed to assess the effectiveness for various regions.  Comparative 
analysis will be utilized to determine the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net 
for representative peanut farms relative to national statistics.   
Data Source 
This study will utilize quantitative secondary data obtained from the USDA and 
the University of Georgia NCPC.  Data from the USDA ERS include farm economy data 
considering the farm sector income and finances.  Specifically, crop insurance premium 
and indemnity payments, net farm income, and financial ratios will be considered at the 
national, state, and county levels when available.  Data from the USDA RMA include 
national and regional statistics related to crop insurance usage, premiums, and indemnity 
payments.  The NCPC maintains a database with current and historical whole farm 
information that captures the characteristics and decision-making process for 20 
representative peanut farms.  The database includes detailed historical production and 
economic data for each commodity represented on that farm.  Each representative peanut 
farm is established by a focus group of four to six producers in a region who develop and 
update the farm to represent the peanut farms in that region.  Thus, at a minimum, the 
representative peanut farms represent more than 100 individual farms throughout the 
major peanut growing regions in the U.S.  These representative peanut farms have been 
used since 2002 to analyze federal policy alternatives.  Data to be analyzed includes 




finances.  Given the utilization of secondary data sources, IRB approval is not required 
for this study.    
Data Estimation Model 
 To reflect the potential impact of crop insurance on a peanut farm, both cost and 
production data from the representative peanut farm database will be used to determine 
crop insurance premiums and indemnity payments.  To foster an understanding of the 
model, a discussion of MPCI options available for peanuts is warranted.   
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance 
When considering crop insurance options for peanuts, current legislation provides 
that producers may purchase three plans at a premium cost based on the plan and 
coverage level chosen.  These plans include Yield Protection (YP), Revenue Protection 
(RP), and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (RHPE).  Yield protection 
protects against a production loss while revenue protection protects against revenue loss, 
which can be due to a production loss, price decline or increase, or a combination of both.  
The revenue protection with harvest price exclusion protects against revenue loss due to 
production loss, price decline, or a combination of both; however, the harvest price is 
excluded for determining the value of production in loss determination.   
Within each of these plan options, a producer also chooses a coverage level 
between 50 to 85 percent of the approved yield.  Selection of higher coverage levels 
provides a higher level of protection.  However, that higher level of protection comes at a 




Cost to Producer  
 Producers are responsible for premiums related to their coverage level and plan 
chosen.  However, those premiums are subsidized at varying rates as shown in Table 2.  
As the level of coverage increases, the percent of premium subsidy declines, thus 
increasing the cost to the producer.  The higher level of coverage chosen can be likened 
to reducing the deductible on an insurance policy.  If a producer chooses only 50 percent 
coverage, 67 percent of the premium cost is subsidized.  However, if the producer 
chooses coverage at 85 percent, only 38 percent of the premium cost is subsidized. 
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33 36 36 41 41 45 52 62 
Source: USDA RMA Summary of Business Report 
An additional cost to the producer includes an administrative fee of $30 per crop 
per county regardless of acreage covered.  In addition to coverage at a premium cost, 
producers may also choose Catastrophic Risk Protection (CAT) coverage, which is fixed 
at 50 percent of the approved yield and 55 percent of the projected price.  CAT is 100 




choosing CAT coverage, there is not a cost for premiums, but there is an administrative 
fee of $300 per crop per county.   
Loss Examples 
 To evaluate the impact of crop insurance on the financial stability of peanut 
farms, an understanding of what constitutes a loss is necessary.  Specifically, what 
triggers an indemnity payment from an insurance plan? A yield protection loss occurs 
when peanut production for an insurance unit falls below the production guarantee due to 
damage from a covered cause of loss.  For example, if the pounds per acre guarantee is 
2,500 under a yield protection policy, should production per acre fall below 2,500 pounds 
because of a covered cause of loss, an indemnity payment will be warranted for the 
difference between actual production and the production guarantee.  Similarly, a revenue 
protection loss occurs when the value of production-to-count (pounds produced 
multiplied by the projected or harvest cost) is less than the revenue protection guarantee 
due to a production loss and/or revenue loss.  For revenue protection policies, the 
insurance guarantee is equal to the production guarantee multiplied by the greater of the 
projected price or harvest price unless the harvest price exclusions election is made.  For 
RHPE plans, the production guarantee per acre and projected price are utilized to 
determine the revenue protection guarantee.  An indemnity payment is rendered when the 
per acre production-to-count value is below the insurance guarantee per acre. 
Representative Peanut Farm Determined Data 
Utilizing the representative peanut farm production and cost data, the projected 
revenue, insurance guarantee, and projected return above variable input cost will be 




coverage option.  From this determined data, comparisons can be made to analyze the 
effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for U.S. peanut producers.  Crop insurance 
will be deemed effective if the projected return above variable input cost is positive. 
Study Variables 
The first step in determining the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for 
peanut producers was to determine the expected gross revenue of the peanut enterprise 
for each representative farm based on expected yields and prices by building an economic 
model to determine the economic returns.  This value represents a producer’s 
expectations that are used to make management decisions when planning for the current 
crop year since it reflects historical production information and current market and 
economic trends.  The expected gross revenue for each farm, then, serves as a baseline 
for the comparison for each of the crop insurance options.  The expected gross revenue 
was used to determine the expected returns above variable input costs for each 
representative farm. 
Next, for each representative farm, the insurance guarantee on a dollar per acre 
basis was determined for the varying coverage levels considered for the peanut 
enterprise.  The insurance guarantee represents the maximum amount per acre that a 
producer could receive if a claim was filed for a covered loss.  Both yield protection and 
revenue protection plans at 50, 60, 65, 70, and 75 percent coverage levels were 
considered for each farm.  For yield protection plans, three different pricing options were 
considered—producer expected price, USDA RMA projected price, and USDA RMA 
maximum contract price—to provide an expected, worst-case, and best-case scenario.  




county and cultivar relevant for each representative peanut farm.  Catastrophic coverage 
was also considered for all farms.  Therefore, for each of the 20 farms, the following 
options or scenarios were considered: 
1) Expected Returns with no cause for insurable claim (Baseline) 
2) Catastrophic Coverage (CAT) 
3) Yield Protection at 50 percent coverage level using expected price (YPE50) 
4) Yield Protection at 60 percent coverage level using expected price (YPE60) 
5) Yield Protection at 65 percent coverage level using expected price (YPE65) 
6) Yield Protection at 70 percent coverage level using expected price (YPE70) 
7) Yield Protection at 75 percent coverage level using expected price (YPE75) 
8) Yield Protection at 50 percent coverage level using projected price (YPP50) 
9) Yield Protection at 60 percent coverage level using projected price (YPP60) 
10) Yield Protection at 65 percent coverage level using projected price (YPP65) 
11) Yield Protection at 70 percent coverage level using projected price (YPP70) 
12) Yield Protection at 75 percent coverage level using projected price (YPP75) 
13) Yield Protection at 50 percent coverage level using maximum contract price 
(YPM50) 
14) Yield Protection at 60 percent coverage level using maximum contract price 
(YPM60) 
15) Yield Protection at 65 percent coverage level using maximum contract price 
(YPM65) 





17) Yield Protection at 75 percent coverage level using maximum contract price 
(YPM75) 
18) Revenue Protection at 50 percent coverage level (RP50) 
19) Revenue Protection at 60 percent coverage level (RP60) 
20) Revenue Protection at 65 percent coverage level (RP65) 
21) Revenue Protection at 70 percent coverage level (RP70) 
22) Revenue Protection at 75 percent coverage level (RP75) 
Utilizing the calculated insurance revenue guarantee and the reported variable 
input costs, the returns above variable input costs were calculated on a per acre basis for 
the peanut enterprise for each representative.  Given the crop insurance scenarios, the 
financial performance of the peanut enterprise was determined for each of the farms by 
calculating the return above variable input cost (RAVIC) on a per acre and per enterprise 
basis under each scenario.  Each resulting RAVIC represents an observation to determine 
the effectiveness of crop insurance for peanut farms.  RAVIC represents the short-term 
economic viability, or financial stability (FS), of the peanut enterprise since economic 
theory posits that an operation should continue to operate in the short run as long as the 
price equals or exceeds the variable operating costs.  When an operation can no longer 
cover the variable operating costs, the operation has reached the “shut down” point and 
can minimize losses by ceasing operation.  While the operation will still face fixed or 
overhead cost, it is not adding additional costs through the loss generated with the price 
being below the variable operating costs.  Thus, for each crop insurance scenario, the 
insurance guarantee (potential maximum price under insurance claim) can be compared 




at that level.  If the RAVIC is greater than or equal to zero, the crop insurance scenario is 
considered to provide financial stability to the farm and deemed effective as a safety net.  
If the value is negative, the crop insurance scenario fails to provide financial stability to 
the farm and is deemed not effective as a safety net. 
Additionally, this study will define, examine, and quantify the following variables 
for the representative U.S. peanut farms:  
Crop Insurance Utilization (CIU) 
Crop Insurance Premium Payment (CIP) 
Crop Insurance Premium Subsidy (CIS) 
Geographic Location (LOC) 
Cultural Practice (CP) 
Enterprise Size (SZE) 
Summary statistics will be provided for each variable.  Further, data will be 
analyzed to test for correlations between variables.  First, it will be determined if 
management practices elect to utilize crop insurance.  If crop insurance was utilized, then 
data will be analyzed to determine what type of plan was selected, and, finally, the level 
of coverage for each specific farm.  The following coding will be used to denote CIU: 
0 = No crop insurance selected 
CAT = Catastrophic Coverage 
YP = Yield Protection 
RP = Revenue Protection  




Next, the crop insurance premium payment (CIP) for each representative farm 
will be determined and analyzed.  As discussed earlier, CIP depends on the type of 
coverage chosen, the level of coverage selected, and the geographic location (LOC) of 
the farm.  The total premium includes a portion paid by the agricultural producer and a 
portion subsidized by the government.  To determine the estimated cost per acre for each 
farm, the USDA RMA cost estimator will be utilized.  The net premium payment for 
producers, CIP, will consider both the total premium and the subsidized portion, CIS.  
Furthermore, the estimated crop insurance premium provided by each representative farm 
panel will be analyzed.  The CIP and CIS will be coded in a dollar per acre format. 
The next three variables are used to denote characteristics of the farm.  The LOC 
will be coded to represent the growing region where the farm is located.  The southeast 
states of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi will be represented by SE.  The 
southwest states of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico will be noted by SW.  Farms 
located in Virginia or the Carolinas will be labeled VC.  The cultural practice, CP, will 
represent the cultivar planted by the farm.  The options include runners (RU), Virginias 
(VI), Spanish (SP), or Valencia (VL).  Finally, the enterprise size (SZE) will be coded 
based on the number of acres of peanuts on the farm.  The following categories will be 
used for SZE: 
1 = 1 to 249 acres 
2 = 250 to 499 acres 
3 = 500 to 749 acres 
4 = 750 to 999 acres 





Various statistical analyses will be conducted.  Descriptive summary statistics 
will be analyzed to describe trends on a national level as well as for the representative 
peanut farms.  Specifically, to test H1, descriptive statistics and simple linear regression 
analyses in Excel comparing relationships between the independent variable CIU and the 
dependent variable FS, represented by the average RAVIC, for each insurance option 
based on the model, FS = βCIU + α will be utilized.  The crop insurance utilization 
analyzed will be limited to the type and coverage level selected.  Trends in enrollment 
type and coverage levels will be reviewed for each representative peanut farm.  National 
trends in crop insurance utilization, coverage type, and the coverage level will be 
considered as well.  Analysis of Variance, or ANOVA., a parametric procedure which 
allows the researcher to compare group means to determine whether the sample averages 
are significantly different from each other or were due to chance probability will also be 
utilized.     
To test H2, the RAVIC will be considered for each insurance policy option 
observation.  The observations will be analyzed to determine the effectiveness of crop 
insurance in providing a safety net for the peanut farm.  An observation will be deemed 
effective if the resulting RAVIC observation is positive.  Results will be reported on a 
percentage basis based on the number of observations relative to the total observations.  
Summary data will also be reported within and across the independent variables of LOC, 
CP, and SZE.  Results for each representative farm will also be discussed.  Summary 





The results of this quantitative study will test the research hypotheses considering 
the relationship between federally subsidized crop insurance as a safety net for U.S. 
peanut producers to aid in providing financial stability to the farm sector.  The 
effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net will be considered for each of the peanut 
producing regions, differing cultural practices, and varying farm sizes in consideration of 
the financial stability of one sector of the agricultural industry.  The financial stability of 










Multiple factors have led to an increase in the utilization of crop insurance by 
agricultural producers.  Current farm policy places significance upon crop insurance to 
provide a safety net for agricultural producers.  However, its effectiveness in providing a 
safety net for peanut producers warrants study.  The results and observations herein are 
intended to be descriptive of the current situation of U.S. peanut farms, the utilization of 
crop insurance, and the effectiveness of crop insurance in providing a safety net for 
representative peanut producers, thereby informing stakeholders as each face 
management decisions in the short and long run.  Furthermore, these results and 
observations can also be utilized to shape agricultural policy at, primarily, the federal 
agency level to ensure an effective safety net is in place to aid in managing risks faced in 
agricultural production and to assure a safe and reliable food source for consumers.       
Crop Insurance in Peanuts at the National Level 
 To provide an overview of crop insurance for peanuts at a national level, NASS 
and RMA data were analyzed.  Table 3 provides a summary of crop insurance utilization 
in peanuts at the national level.  This table illustrates the prevalence of crop insurance 
utilization with the percent of planted acres insured by some form of crop insurance 
ranging from 85 to 93 percent between 2012 and 2017 with an average of 90 percent for 
this time frame.  The last two years show a lower relative percent insured; however, it 




this national level data supports the importance of crop insurance in peanut production 
and the need for further study in consideration of its effectiveness as a safety net for 
peanut farms.     
Table 3. National Peanut Acreage Planted and Insured  
Year Acres Planted  Acres Insured  % of Total Acres Insured 
2012 1,638,000   1,513,649    92% 
2013 1,067,000   974,061    91% 
2014 1,353,500   1,259,369    93% 
2015 1,625,000   1,502,361    92% 
2016 1,671,000   1,412,287    85% 
2017 1,870,600   1,643,564    88%   
Source: USDA NASS and USDA RMA Summary of Business Report 
 Next, the varying coverage levels utilized in peanuts was considered at the 
national level as shown in Table 4.  From 2012 to 2017, a 70 percent coverage level was 
chosen most frequently with an average of 31 percent of the insured acres covered at this 
level.  A coverage level of 75 percent was the next most frequent level chosen with an 
average of 21 percent of the acreage covered at this level, followed by a tie at 18 percent 
for both the 65 and 50 percent coverage level.  With roughly 70 percent of peanut acreage 
covered at a level between 65 and 75 percent, the levels chosen for analysis of 
representative peanut farm data appear relevant.  On average, only 5 percent of the 
acreage is covered at 80 percent or more and 7 percent at a 55 to 60 percent coverage 




only 4 percent, there has been an increase in the percent of acres covered at this higher 
level of coverage in most recent years relative to early years in this analysis.  
Table 4. National Coverage Level Selected by Percent of Acreage by Year for Peanuts  
Coverage Level Chosen  
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
2012  21% 1% 7% 22% 31% 16% 2% 0% 
2013  22% 1% 7% 22% 30% 16% 2% 0% 
2014  21% 1% 7% 21% 29% 18% 3% 1% 
2015  14% 1% 4% 15% 32% 25% 7% 2% 
2016  15% 0% 5% 14% 32% 26% 6% 1% 
2017  14% 0% 5% 13% 32% 27% 7% 1% 
AVERAGE 18% 1% 6% 18% 31% 21% 4% 1% 
Source: USDA RMA Summary of Business Report 
Next, the types of crop insurance utilized were analyzed, and the results are 
summarized in Table 5.  For this analysis, data for 2015 to 2018 were considered.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the 2014 Farm Bill brought about changes to the types of policies 
available.  Some insurance policies available before 2015 are no longer an option for 
peanut producers while new ones were introduced.  The types of insurance available and 
analyzed include Catastrophic (CAT), Revenue Protection (RP), Revenue Protection with 
Harvest Price Exclusions (RPHPE), and Yield Protection (YP).  Nationally across the 
four-year average, yield protection was chosen in 48 percent of the covered acres 
followed by revenue protection at 40 percent and catastrophic at 12 percent.  Revenue 




observations are made regarding the yield and revenue protection.  After the change in 
available policy types, RP garnered significant support in 2015 and 2016 with over 60 
percent of the acreage covered by this type of policy.  For the 2017 and 2018 crop years, 
YP was the choice for more than 70 percent of the planted peanut acreage.     
Table 5. Crop Insurance Selection by Policy, Percent of Peanut Acreage by Year 
  CAT  RP  RPHPE YP 
2015  10%  68%  0%  22% 
2016  10%  65%  1%  24% 
2017  10%  19%  0%  71% 
2018  17%  9%  0%  74% 
AVG  12%  40%  0%  48% 
Source: USDA RMA Summary of Business Report 
Representative Farm Characteristics 
Next, the characteristics of the representative farms were considered.  The choices 
analyzed represent management decisions for the 2017 crop year.  The representative 
farm characteristics are summarized in Table 6.  Of the 20 representative farms, 10 
percent indicated CAT, 65 percent indicated YP, 15 percent indicated RP, and 10 percent 
were undetermined when considering what type of crop insurance coverage to purchase 
for peanuts.  These management choices align with the national averages discussed 
previously.  The undetermined farms can be considered representative of the percentage 
of acreage not covered by crop insurance while no farms chose the RPHE.  The percent 
of farms utilizing CAT coverage matched the national percentage of acreage with this 




choosing YP and slightly higher choosing RP for 2017.  However, it is important to note 
the representative farm values discussed consider the number of representative farms and 
not the total number of acres in the representative farms.  
Table 6. Type of Crop Insurance Chosen by Representative Peanut Farms 
Coverage Type  Number of Farms Percent of Farms  
CAT       2     10% 
YP     13     65% 
RP       3     15% 
Undetermined      2     10% 
Total     20   100% 
Source: UGA NCPC 
 Beyond the type of insurance coverage chosen, it is also relevant to review the 
levels of coverage chosen by the representative peanut farms.  Forty-four percent of the 
farms choosing coverage other than CAT chose a 65 percent coverage level.  An equal 
number of farms chose 50 percent and 70 percent coverage level.  No farms chose a 
coverage level above 75 percent as shown in Table 7.  While the crop insurance chosen 
by two representative farms was undetermined, those two farms chose coverage at 50 and 
60 percent under the previous crop insurance provisions.  Neither had chosen catastrophic 
with both opting for the actual production history (APH).  For 2017, 60 percent of all 
representative farms, three-fourths of those with coverage other than CAT, chose a level 





Table 7. Level of Coverage of Crop Insurance Chosen by Representative Peanut Farms 
Coverage Type  Number of Farms* Percent of Farms  
50     3   19% 
60     1   6% 
65     7   44% 
70     3   19% 
75     2   13% 
Total     16   100% 
*Excludes farms choosing catastrophic (2) or undetermined (2) 
Source: UGA NCPC 
 Peanuts are produced primarily in three distinct geographic growing regions in the 
U.S.  These include the Southeast, encompassing the states of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
and Mississippi; the Southwest, which includes Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico; and 
the Virginia-Carolina region, which includes Virginia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina.  The National Peanut Board reports that for 2014, production in the Southeast 
region accounted for more than 70 percent of the quantity produced in the U.S. 
Meanwhile, the Virginia-Carolina region accounted for 17 percent while the Southwest 
accounted for the remaining 11 percent.  The representative peanut farms are distributed 
throughout the peanut growing region with 65 percent of the farms located in the 
Southeast, 25 percent in the Southwest, and 10 percent in the Virginia-Carolina region as 
shown in Table 8.  When the acreage reflected in the representative peanut farms is 
considered, 69 percent of the total acreage is in the Southeast, with 22 percent in the 




Table 8. Representative Peanut Farm Location 
Region   Number of Farms  Percent of Farms 
Southeast   13    65% 
Southwest   5    25% 
Virginia-Carolina  2    10%  
Source: UGA NCPC 
 Along with the different growing regions also come differences in the cultural 
practices and cultivars planted.  The different cultivars considered include runner, 
Virginia, Valencia, and Spanish.  Table 9 provides a summary of the number of farms 
producing each cultivar.  Runner peanuts, which tend to be uniform in kernel size and are 
most commonly used in peanut butter production, account for 80 percent of the peanuts 
produced in the U.S.  Virginia peanuts are the largest of the cultivars produced in the U.S. 
and account for 15 percent of the U.S. production.  Valencia peanuts, which have three or 
more kernels per shell, account for less than one percent of the total U.S. production.  The 
Spanish cultivars, with their red skins and smaller kernels, account for four percent of the 
U.S. production.  The distribution of cultivars on the representative peanut farms closely 
resembles the U.S. production distribution except for VI being slightly underrepresented 
and VL slightly overrepresented. 
Table 9. Cultural Practice as Cultivar Type for Representative Peanut Farms 
Cultivar   Number of Farms  Percent of Farms 
Runner   16    80% 
Virginia   2    10% 
Valencia   1    5% 
Spanish   1    5%  




The last representative peanut farm characteristic that will be further analyzed 
when considering the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net is the farm size.  For 
each farm, the number of acres of peanuts was used to classify the farm into one of five 
categories.  The breakdown of sizes is detailed in Chapter 3 and shown in Table 10.  It is 
important to note that while there are boundaries used to categorize these farms, the 
farms’ total acreage will likely be much higher given the need for good rotational 
practices in peanut production.  Many farms will follow a two- to three-year rotation 
between peanut plantings to maintain yield and quality standards.  Therefore, the crop 
acreage for a given farm would typically be three to four times greater than the peanut 
acreage.  For example, a farm with 1,000 acres of peanuts would need a total of 3,000 
cultivatable acres to maintain a two-year rotation between peanuts or 4,000 cultivatable 
acres to maintain a three-year rotation between peanuts.  Operation size, management 
production practices, and operation diversity can each impact management decisions and 
eventual production output.  For the representative peanut farms, 70 percent fell between 
the second and third sizes, which ranged from 250 to 749 acres of peanuts.  Data from the 
2012 Census of Agriculture indicates over 79 percent of peanut farms in the U.S. are 
farms with more than 260 acres and over two-thirds of the peanut farms are 500 acres or 
more.  The average number of peanut acres across all farms was 559 acres with an 
estimated yield of 2.19 tons per acre.  This average size would imply a total farm size 






Table 10. Farm Size by Peanut Acreage for Representative Peanut Farms 
Acres of Peanuts  Number of Farms  Percent of Farms 
1 - 249    2    10% 
250 - 499   7    35% 
500 - 749   7    35% 
750 - 999   2    10% 
1,000 or more   2    10% 
Source: UGA NCPC 
Representative Farm Model 
To reflect the potential impact of crop insurance on a peanut farm, both cost and 
production data from the representative peanut farm database were used to estimate crop 
insurance premiums, indemnity payments, and net returns.  The first step in determining 
the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for peanut producers was to determine 
the expected gross revenue of the peanut enterprise for each representative farm based on 
expected yields and prices.  Next, the reported variable input cost for each representative 
farm was considered.  Utilizing an economic model, the expected economic returns above 
variable input cost, RAVIC were determined for each farm.  This value represents a 
producer’s expectations that are used to make management decisions when planning for 
the current crop year since it reflects historical production information and current market 
and economic trends.  It serves as a guide for management to determine if the enterprise 
should shut down or continue to operate in the short run.  Furthermore, the RAVIC 
calculated for each farm serves as a baseline for comparison for each of the various crop 




Table 11. Expected Returns above Variable Input Cost for Peanuts 
Farm   Baseline   Total RAVIC   CIURAVIC 
$/Acre   Peanut Enterprise $/Acre 
A   $325.37    $357,907.25    $(180.01) 
B   $357.56    $259,229.45    $(336.05) 
C   $247.56    $82,188.64    $165.98  
D   $276.42    $138,209.22    $(28.88) 
F   $251.89    $100,754.00    $37.08  
G   $192.65    $81,876.25    $76.68  
H   $193.01    $77,203.00    $(60.71) 
I   $181.85    $127,295.00    $52.75  
J   $150.17    $99,860.39    $(33.76) 
K   $60.38    $30,190.00   $(8.97) 
N   $297.81    $119,124.00    $(13.65) 
O   $20.88    $12,529.20    $64.80  
P   $298.26    $238,608.00    $(447.39) 
Q   $61.01    $14,642.40    $(501.33) 
R   $159.56    $159,560.00    $(186.68) 
S   $151.69    $27,303.60    $(187.24) 
T   $232.75    $58,187.50    $(121.61) 
U   $521.13    $442,959.00    $224.25  
V   $(16.67)   $(12,001.40)   $(34.42) 
W   $397.34    $158,936.00    $2.10  




The baseline expected net income for the 20 representative peanut farms ranges 
from a loss of almost $17 per acre to a return of more than $520 per acre with an average 
return across all farms of $218 per acre.  Nineteen of the farms, 95 percent, expect 
positive returns above variable input costs.  Total expected peanut enterprise returns 
range from a loss of $12,000 to positive returns of almost $443,000.  Analysis of the 
variance shows great variability in both the return per acre and enterprise returns for 
peanuts across the representative farms with R-squared values of 0.0127 and 0.0251, 
respectively.  From a management perspective based on economic theory, farm V should 
shut down and not operate in the short run since it cannot cover the variable input cost of 
operating. 
The next step in analyzing the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net was 
to estimate the insurance guarantee on a dollar per acre basis for each representative 
peanut farm for the varying coverage types and levels considered.  The insurance 
guarantee represents the maximum amount per acre that a producer could receive if a 
claim was filed for a covered loss.  Both yield protection and revenue protection plans 
were considered for each farm.  For the yield protection plans expected, worst and best-
case scenarios were considered.  The expected scenario, YPE, utilized the expected price 
supplied by the representative farm panel and also used in calculating the baseline net 
income unless that price exceeded the maximum allowed contract peanut price.  The 
worst-case scenario, YPP, utilized the RMA projected price for the cultivar and region 
while the best-case scenario, YPM, utilized the RMA maximum contract price allowed.  
The revenue protection model, RP, utilized the USDA RMA projected and harvested 




chose the revenue protection with harvest price exclusion, the study excluded that policy.  
Each of the YP and RP models considered coverage levels at 50, 60, 65, 70, and 75 
percent.  Therefore, for each of the 20 farms, there were twenty different possible 
premium insurance policy elections.  Catastrophic coverage was also considered for each 
of the farms.   
Once the potential returns per acre under the given insurance election were 
calculated for each farm and insurance policy election, the variable input costs were 
subtracted to derive the expected returns above variable input costs for each farm.  Also 
included in the costs were any adjustments needed to correct for over or understatement 
of producer premium for the corresponding level of insurance coverage.  During the most 
recent representative farm panel update meetings, producers indicated the coverage type 
and level for the peanut enterprise.  Table 11 includes the expected returns above variable 
input costs given the crop insurance type and coverage level indicated by each 
representative farm.  The maximum potential payout was calculated.  Then, the variable 
input costs were subtracted from that value to arrive at the crop insurance return above 
variable input cost (CIURAVIC).   
Considering the crop insurance type and levels chosen by management, only 7 of 
the 20 farms, 35 percent, would have positive returns above variable input costs should a 
peril take place that resulted in an insurance claim.  The average return after insurance 
indemnity payments would be a loss of almost $76 per acre, with maximum and 
minimum returns of $224 and ($501), respectively, per acre.  The majority of the 
representative peanut farms are considerably worse off on a dollar per acre basis relative 




return per acre for crop insurance guarantee relative to the baseline.  For this farm, the 
reported expected price is less than the USDA RMA projected price for peanuts.  Further 
study is warranted to determine the cause of the lower reported expected price.  
Determining how to measure or quantify the effectiveness of a policy option can 
be difficult.  Different management styles, risk propensities, or levels of profitability 
expectations could impact how effectiveness is gauged.  To further exacerbate the topic 
of interest in this study, defining what a safety net entails can be just as challenging.  For 
this study, a crop insurance policy option was deemed effective as a safety net if the 
RAVIC for that policy option observation was positive.  A positive RAVIC means the 
variable input expenses are covered, and funds are available to help cover the fixed and 
opportunity costs that remain.  Given that 65 percent of the farms showed negative 
returns after insurance indemnity payments for the chosen coverage, CIURAVIC, the 
effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net warrants further study.  To further analyze 
the effectiveness, expected, best, and worst-case scenarios at a range of coverage levels 
for yield protection and revenue protection were analyzed. 
Testing Hypothesis1: Relationship between CIU and FS 
 To determine if a positive relationship exists between crop insurance utilization 
and the financial stability of a representative U.S. peanut farm, the average returns above 
variable input costs across all representative peanut farms were analyzed for each 
insurance policy option.  Figure 2 shows the results for each option.  Linear regression 
indicates there is a positive relationship within an insurance policy type of protection as 
the coverage level increases.  The results, however, indicate that out of the 21 different 




input costs when averaged across all farms, thus challenging the effectiveness of crop 
insurance as a safety net. 
Figure 2. Returns above Variable Input Cost for Insurance Policy Options ($/Acre) 
 
 
Effectiveness of Crop Insurance Summary Analysis 
Figure 3 provides a visual representation of crop insurance effectiveness for 
representative peanut farms across different independent variables considered in this 
study.  For CAT insurance coverage, there were no observations of positive net returns 
above variable input costs; therefore, it would not be deemed an effective safety net for 
peanut producers given the measurement guidelines established for this study.  When 
considering yield protection policies across all levels of coverage and projected price 
options, 32 percent of the observations resulted in positive net returns.  Meanwhile, 
revenue protection policies resulted in 18 percent of the observations showing a positive 
















return above variable input costs.  For those positive observations, crop insurance can be 
considered an effective risk management tool.  The average RAVIC across all farms and 
coverage levels for yield protection policies was ($77) per acre while the average for 
revenue protection across all farms and coverage levels was ($117) per acre.  Analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) indicates the statistical significance of this difference with a resulting 
p-value of 0.037.  Yield protection policies can be considered statistically more effective 
as a safety net than revenue protection policies.  However, given that the average returns 
for each are negative neither would meet the criteria outlined in this study to be deemed 
effective as a safety net for peanut producers. 
Considering the coverage level across all protection types and pricing options, as 
would be expected, an increase in positive observations was seen as the coverage level 
increases.  The percent of positive observations was only six at a 50 percent coverage 
level.  With a 10-percentage point increase in the coverage level, the positive 
observations more than double to 14 percent.  As the coverage level increased to 65 
percent, a 100 percent increase in positive observations resulted with 28 percent of all 
occurrences having a positive return above variable input costs.  Given a 75 percent 
coverage level across both yield and revenue protection as well as the different pricing 
options, almost 58 percent of the observations resulted in a positive return above variable 
input costs.  For each of the positive observations, crop insurance can be considered an 
effective tool in providing a safety net for peanut producers.  However, it is pertinent to 
point out that at the upper end of the available coverage levels, which come at a higher 
cost to the peanut producer, more than 40 percent of the observations did not cover 




observations at a 75 percent coverage level, crop insurance was not effective as a safety 
net based on the criteria set forth in this study.  The average return above variable costs 
across all farms and coverage types was calculated for each coverage level.  This average 
for all levels of coverage determined was negative except for the 75 percent coverage 
level.  The average returns range from a loss of $200 per acre for 50 percent coverage 
level to positive returns of $9 per acre for 75 percent coverage level.  Considering the 
average for each coverage level, only the 75 percent coverage would be considered to 
meet the criteria to provide an effective safety net for peanut producers.  Furthermore, 
ANOVA indicates the difference between groups is statistically significant for the 
varying levels of coverage.  
Figure 3. Effectiveness of Crop Insurance (Percentage of total observations) 
 
Next, the three peanut producing regions, Southeast, Southwest, and Virginia-
































































all farms in a region were analyzed and are summarized in Table 12.  For the Southeast, 
33 percent of the observations were deemed effective, followed by the Virginia-Carolina 
region with 26 percent, and the Southwest with 10 percent.  Given that the cultivar 
planted is heavily influenced by the geographic production region, the RAVIC across 
cultivars resulted in similar findings as LOC.  Runner type peanuts saw a 30 percent 
effectiveness, followed by Virginia type peanuts at 26 percent.  The two cultivars 
primarily grown in the Southwest, Spanish and Valencia, showed five and zero percent 
effectiveness, respectively, of crop insurance as evidenced by positive returns above 
variable input costs.  ANOVA indicated statistically significant differences between the 
groups for both regions and cultivars. 
Table 12. Regional and Cultivar Summary Observations for Effective Observations 
(Percent of Total) and Average RAVIC $/acre 
Region  Percent Effective  RAVIC 
SE    33%   ($62.66) 
SW   10%   ($215.65) 
VC   26%   ($82.96) 
Cultivar Percent Effective  RAVIC 
Runner  30%   ($71.43) 
Virginia  26%   ($82.96) 
Spanish  5%   ($179.61) 
Valencia  0%   ($570.31)  





The next independent variable considered was operation size.  Each representative 
farm was categorized into one of five options based on peanut acreage to test for 
differences in effectiveness of crop insurance based on the operation size.  The categories 
did not overlap and each farm could only be put in one category.  Table 13 shows that 
categories 1, 4, and 5 each included 10 percent of the representative peanut farms while 
categories three and four each included 35 percent, or seven farms.  Again, the returns 
above variable input costs were considered to determine the effectiveness of crop 
insurance as a safety net.  
For farms with less than 250 acres of peanuts, only two percent of the 
observations were effective, and the RAVIC across all policy types, coverage levels, and 
pricing options was a loss of almost $375 per acre.  Operations with more than 1,000 
acres of peanuts only had 14 percent observations effective with the average RAVIC a 
loss of more than $130 per acre.  Farms with 250 to 499 acres of peanuts and those with 
peanut acreage between 500 to 749 saw similar rates of effective observations with 29 
and 26 percent respectively.  The larger farms, 500 to 749 acres, saw a larger net loss at 
almost $105 per acre compared to a net loss of $54 per acre for farms between 250 to 499 
acres.  
The size four category, which included 750 to 999 acres of peanuts, showed 60 
percent of the observations as positive.  This category was also the only operation size 
that resulted in a positive return above variable input costs.  Therefore, crop insurance 
can be considered effective for peanut operations with more than 750 acres but less than 





Table 13. Operation Size Summary, Effective Observations and Average RAVIC $/acre 
Operation Size Percent Effective RAVIC $/acre 
SZ1   2%   ($374.96) 
SZ2   29%   ($53.743) 
SZ3   26%   ($104.70) 
SZ4   60%   $30.98 
SZ5   14%   ($130.81) 
Source: UGA NCPC 
Given the statistical differences observed between the independent variables 
discussed, each insurance policy protection model was analyzed for the varying coverage 
levels across all representative farms.  Considering five different coverage levels and 20 
representative farms, a total of one hundred observations resulted for each insurance 
model.  For each policy type and coverage level, Table 14 shows the number of farms 
with a positive net return along with the maximum, minimum, and average RAVIC on a 
per acre basis.  The model with the greatest likelihood of positive net returns is the yield 
protection at the maximum contract price.  Of the 100 observations across all farms and 
coverage levels, 58 resulted in positive net returns or 58 percent effective observations.  
Utilizing the producers’ expected price, 21 observations were positive, while the RMA 
projected price resulted in only 16 out of 100 observations being positive.  The revenue 
protection plan resulted in 18 positive observations given USDA RMA projected and 
harvest prices.  The USDA RMA prices did not show great variability for 2017.  
However, should the market become more volatile at harvest time, the revenue protection 




Table 14. Summary of Determined Returns above Variable Input Cost for Yield 
Protection Crop Insurance Plans and Coverage levels, Quantity of Farms, $/acre 
Model   YPE50   YPE60   YPE65   YPE70   YPE75  
No. Positive 1  1  3  5  11 
Max  $9.42   $112.36  $163.83  $211.62  $266.78  
Min  ($614.29) ($541.15) ($501.33) ($468.77) ($417.19) 
Average  ($229.30) ($143.46) ($104.29) ($63.74) ($20.07) 
Model  YPP50  YPP60  YPP65  YPP70  YPP75  
No. Positive  1    1    2    4   8 
Max  $0.50   $102.26  $153.14  $203.33  $254.90  
Min  ($697.99) ($619.99) ($586.74) ($560.75) ($533.74) 
Average  ($232.72) ($147.58) ($106.46) ($65.92) ($25.46) 
Model   YPM50   YPM60   YPM65   YPM70   YPM75  
No. Positive  2    8    14    16    18  
Max  $102.16  $224.25  $285.29  $345.65  $407.38  
Min  ($632.29) ($541.15) ($501.33) ($468.77) ($435.19) 
Average ($144.40) ($41.59) $8.35   $57.73  $107.02 
Model  RP 50    RP 60    RP 65    RP 70    RP 75  
No. Positive  1    1    3    4    9  
Max  $0.50   $102.26  $153.14  $204.02  $254.90  
Min  ($697.69) ($631.93) ($599.05) ($566.17) ($533.29) 
Average ($234.29) ($150.96) ($106.79) ($68.45) ($24.84) 




The final data analysis to be considered in this study is to look at each 
representative farm, individually, to determine the effectiveness of crop insurance across 
all observations for a farm.  Figure 4 shows the percent of observations deemed effective 
for each farm, which ranged from a low of zero percent for two of the farms to a high of 
100 percent for one farm.  The range of 5 to 15 percent effective included 6 farms; five 
were in the range of 20 to 30 percent effective, and three had 35 percent of the 
observations considered effective.  The three remaining farms experienced 50, 60, and 70 
percent of observations deemed effective. 
Figure 4. Percent of observations deemed effective and average RAVIC for each farm 
$/acre 
  
Source: UGA NCPC 
The average return above variable input cost across all protection options and 














































4.  Three farms had a positive RAVIC, ranging from $19 to $178 per acre, while the other 
17 farms showed a negative RAVIC across all options.  When considering the farms 
independently, crop insurance is considered effective for 15 percent of the representative 
peanut farms based on the assumptions set forth.  The individual rate of effectiveness for 
a farm varied depending on the specific factors considered in this analysis. 
Summary 
 Crop insurance selection for a peanut enterprise is multi-faceted.  Decisions must 
be made on policy type, including catastrophic, yield protection, revenue protection, or 
revenue protection with harvest price exclusion, for a range of coverage levels and 
pricing options.  This study only considered a portion of those options, but the magnitude 
of data quickly grew.  In consideration of the first objective of this study, which was to 
determine the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for peanut producers, data 
were analyzed at several levels ranging from an individual response for a specific farm 
for a certain coverage type and level to average responses across multiple variables.  The 
level of effectiveness varies within each of the variables.  In general, the yield protection 
model generated a greater level of effectiveness than the revenue protection or 
catastrophic policies but was effective on less than one-third of the total observations.  A 
higher coverage level resulted in higher levels of effectiveness, but even at the maximum 
level tested, 75 percent coverage, less than 3 out of 5 of the observations were deemed 
effective.  Differences in effectiveness were seen across regions and cultivars, with the 
maximum effectiveness for any of these only at one-third of the observations.  When 
considering the effectiveness by farm size, farms with peanut acreage in the 750 to 999 




farms, all observations were positive for one farm while two other farms also reflected a 
positive average return above variable input cost.  There were also two farms that had no 












This study presents an objective analysis of agricultural policy by considering the 
impact of federal crop insurance on U.S. peanut farms.  The study analyzes the 
effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net using a case study approach.  Employing a 
proactive approach, it provides valuable insight into the utilization of crop insurance by 
peanut farms, the potential impact to the peanut industry, and the economic health and 
well-being of one sector of the agricultural industry that can augment current and future 
political analysis and debate in drafting agricultural policy related to peanut production.  
Findings from the study point out differences in the effectiveness of crop insurance as a 
safety net among insurance options, geographic regions, cultural practices, and farm size.   
Additionally, it highlights future research needs which could encompass analysis 
of the effectiveness of crop insurance on additional agricultural commodities and regions 
or even the consideration of other risk management tools.  The study further emphasizes 
that while the need for agriculture remains a constant, federal intervention to stabilize the 
industry over the last eight decades has not, as evidenced by changes in agricultural 
policy and the form and nature of agricultural programs.  Furthermore, the agricultural 
safety net will continue to evolve with the drafting of each new farm bill and proactive 




Limitations of the Study   
 There are obvious limitations to this study that should be acknowledged.  First, 
the management practices and resource availability and utilization on a U.S. peanut farm 
are as unique and varied as an individual.  To capture the specific management decisions 
related to federal crop insurance, risk management tools, and the current financial 
position of each peanut farm is not feasible.  However, the NCPC representative peanut 
farm database, which includes current and historical whole farm information, is viewed 
as a reliable source that captures the characteristics and decision-making process of 
peanut farms.  As indicated, each representative peanut farm was established by a focus 
group of four to six producers in a region who develop and update the farm to represent 
the peanut farms in that region.  Thus, at a minimum, the representative peanut farms 
represent more than 100 individual farms throughout the major peanut growing regions in 
the U.S.  These representative peanut farms have been used since 2002 to analyze federal 
policy alternatives.   
An additional limitation of the study may be the varying levels of risk propensity 
for individual decision makers, which may result in differing views on what is deemed an 
“effective safety net.”  The parameters and definitions utilized in this study to determine 
the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net are clearly identified.  However, 
consideration of a broader set of parameters could supply additional insight. 
Finally, the nature of the study and time limits set thereupon limit the scope of a 
study that would be deemed reasonable to complete.  Analysis of public policy and public 






 The analysis presented in this study provides insight into the impact of 
agricultural policy on one commodity within a larger industry.  It points to differences in 
the effectiveness of crop insurance as a safety net for peanut producers which warrant 
further study into effective policy options for government intervention intended to 
provide a farm safety net to agricultural producers.  It also provides data to better inform 
stakeholders and decision-makers as future policy is shaped.   
The study points out wide variations in the stability of agricultural revenue for 
peanut farms.  The underlying question of whether the current enacted farm policies 
regarding crop insurance provide an effective safety net to stabilize producer income 
while ensuring a safe and affordable food source for consumers was examined.  How that 
question is answered depends upon the level at which it is analyzed.  From a broad, 
general perspective across all farms, regions, and insurance options, crop insurance does 
not appear to be effective as a safety net to stabilize farm income based on the criteria set 
forth within this study.  However, when additional parameters are included, observations 
pointing to the effectiveness exist at the farm level.  The study confirms that higher levels 
of coverage provide a more effective safety net.  It indicates that for some farms none of 
the crop insurance options available will provide an effective safety net. 
 This study also reveals what appears to be deeper concern regarding the financial 
stability of agricultural production.  The analysis in this study only considered the 
variable input cost of peanut production.  Additional costs for the farm entity include 
fixed or overhead costs and the opportunity cost of the resources employed.  These 




values for individual farms, many would not be able to cover these additional costs of 
production.  Evaluation of farm financial indicators, including the current ratio and debt-
to-asset (DTA) ratio, indicates a decline in the overall financial health of representative 
peanut farms from 2012 to 2016 as the current assets relative to current liabilities have 
declined while the amount of debt relative to assets has increased.  While general 
financial analysis may indicate that the “normal” range for DTA ratio is from 30 to 60 
percent, the USDA reported average farm sector debt-to-asset value is 12 percent.  The 
2016 average DTA across all representative peanut farms was 51 percent with only three 
farms with a value less than 30 percent and categorized as financially strong.  Nine of the 
13 farms categorized as normal have a value closer to the upper boundary, 60 percent, 
than the lower boundary of 30 percent.  These shifts prompt concern for the economic 
viability of the peanut industry. 
Recommendations for Future Research  
 While this study provided a sound, but cursory, exploration of the effectiveness of 
crop insurance utilization in peanut production through case study analysis of the 
representative peanut farm database, this investigation further uncovers challenges and 
opportunities to explore within the industry.  Since peanut farms typically produce other 
commodities, a first step would be to analyze the effectiveness of crop insurance for the 
other crops produced on the farm and consider the effectiveness of crop insurance on a 
whole farm level.   
Another area worthy of additional research relates to quality issues.  Specifically, 
do crop insurance policies provide an effective safety net when quality issues arise?  




The analysis included in this study assumed no quality degradation for peanuts produced 
or sold.  However, in situations where an insurable loss occurs, the quality often declines.  
What is the impact of peanuts that are a lower quality grade or even classified as 
segregation 2 or 3, which results in a lower price paid to a producer?   
Supplementary study is also warranted to capture changes in peanut prices 
between regions or across years for both projected and harvest prices given the limited 
availability of data for these price variations since the changes to crop insurance policies 
are a result of the 2014 Farm Bill and considering the lack of a futures commodity 
exchange for peanuts.  A sensitivity price analysis model to simulate a variety of price 
changes and estimate the impact on management decisions should be considered. 
Finally, given the recent and continued decline in the financial environment of the 
farm economy, further study into the financial health of peanut farms and the impact of 
crop insurance premium and indemnity payments is warranted.  Each of these areas of 
study can provide relevant and vital information to stakeholders and key decision makers 
to help assure knowledgeable assessments and options as public administration 
challenges facing the agricultural industry, well beyond the 2018 Farm Bill, are 
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